* The information provided below is compiled from various independent organizations working on election defense. US BASE cannot verify the accuracy of all data. Additionally we cannot vet every state or local organization working on election defense. 

 

Arizona Technology in Use
Verified Voting Foundation

* Note that "Paper Ballot" in the map below typically designates paper ballots counted by an electronic scanning device. 

Click for Verified Voting's interactive map

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Center for American Progress State by State Voting System Report

See State Grade Below
 

Report Excerpt:

"In August 2017, the Center for American Progress released a report entitled “9 Solutions for Securing America’s Elections,” laying out nine vulnerabilities in election infrastructure and solutions to help improve election security in time for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This report builds on that analysis to provide an overview of election security and preparedness in each state, looking specifically at state requirements and practices related to:

1. Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
2. Voter-verified paper ballots
3. Post-election audits that test election results
4. Ballot accounting and reconciliation
5. Return of voted paper absentee ballots
6. Voting machine certification requirements
7. Pre-election logic and accuracy testing

This report provides an overview of state compliance with baseline standards to protect their elections from hacking and machine malfunction. Some experts may contend that additional standards, beyond those mentioned here, should be required of states to improve election security. The chief purpose of this report is to provide information on how states are faring in meeting even the minimum standards necessary to help secure their elections.

It is important to note at the outset that this report is not meant to be comprehen- sive of all practices that touch on issues of election security. We recognize that local jurisdictions sometimes have different or supplemental requirements and proce- dures from those required by the state. However, this report only considers state requirements reflected in statutes and regulations and does not include the more granular—and voluminous—information on more localized practices. Furthermore, this report does not address specific information technology (IT) requirements for voting machine hardware, software, or the design of pre-election testing ballots and system programming. And while we consider some minimum cybersecurity best practices, we do not analyze specific cyberinfrastructure or system programming requirements. These technical standards and protocols deserve analysis by computer scientists and IT professionals who have the necessary expertise to adequately assess the sufficiency of state requirements in those specialized areas."

Arizona: D

Arizona uses paper ballots and voting machines that provide paper records, but the state’s post-election audits do not include provisional ballots and are based on a fixed percentage of precincts rather than the margin of victory in one or more ballot contests. Most troublesome, however, is that post-election audits are only conducted if the political parties designate at least two election board members to carry out the audit by 5 p.m. on the Thursday preceding an election. And while we have been told that the state’s largest county—Maricopa County—has always been able to meet these requirements since the law’s enactment in 2006, it is unclear whether this is true of Arizona’s other 14 counties. The state also fails to adhere to some important best practices for voter registration system cybersecurity, and its ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures could use improvement. Adding to this is the fact that Arizona allows voters stationed or living overseas to return voted ballots electronically, a practice that election security experts say is notoriously insecure. The state did earn points for requiring that all voting machines be tested to EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines before being purchased or used in the state, and for requiring election officials to carry out pre-election logic and accuracy testing on all machines that will be used in an upcoming election.

To improve its overall election security, Arizona should strengthen its postelection audit requirements. Elections in Arizona will remain vulnerable until the state requires robust post-election audits after every election. These audits must be comprehensive and capable of determining—with a high degree of confidence— that election outcomes are correct. Additionally, Arizona should require electronic poll books to undergo pre-election testing before voting periods. Backup paper voter registration lists should also be required at polling places that use electronic poll books. Although the state requires that backup electronic poll books be provided, these electronic backups will do nothing to ensure that eligible voters can cast ballots that count if there is widespread system failure or a major cyberbreach that corrupted the entire electronic database. Moreover, Arizona should prohibit electronic absentee voting and strengthen its ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures by requiring counties to compare and reconcile precinct totals with composite results to ensure they add up to the correct number.

Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration system: Mixed

  • The state’s voter registration system is estimated to be at least 10 years old.

  • The state’s voter registration system provides access control to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the database.

  • The state’s voter registration system has logging capabilities to track modifications to the database.

  • The state’s voter registration system includes an intrusion detection system that monitors incoming and outgoing traffic for irregularities.

  • The state performs regular vulnerability assessments on its voter registration database.

  • The state has enlisted DHS to help assess and identify potential threats to its voter registration system.

  • Election officials are updating training regimens for election officials to include cybersecurity training.

  • Electronic poll books are used by some, but not all, jurisdictions in the state. State law requires that at least two electronic poll books—capable of printing voter registration lists—be provided to polling places that choose to use them. Paper copies of voter registration lists are not available at all polling places that use electronic poll books. Testing is carried out on at some—but not all—electronic poll books prior to Election Day. The state conducts pre-election testing on electronic poll books prior to an election.


Voter-verified paper audit trail: Good

  • Arizona almost exclusively uses paper ballots, though some counties employ limited use of VVPR-producing DRE machines intended for voters with disabilities.


Post-election audits: Unsatisfactory

  • While the state has a post-election audit requirement, the law also specifies that an audit can only be carried out if the political parties designate at least two election board members to carry out the audit. The names of these people must be provided, in writing, to the recorder or officer in charge of elections by 5 p.m. on the Thursday preceding the election. Since the audit requirement was passed in 2006, Maricopa County always has had a sufficient number of board members provided by the political parties to conduct the audit. However, this may not always be true of the state’s other 14 counties.

  • The state’s post-election audits are conducted through manual hand count.

  • In each county at least 2 percent of precincts are tested, or two precincts total, whichever is greater. Audits examine up to five contested races, though for a general presidential election audits must include the presidential contest, one statewide ballot measure if any exist, one contested race for statewide office, one contested U.S. House or Senate race, and one contested race for state legislative office.

  • The precincts and contests included in the audit are randomly selected.

  • Audits do not examine provisional ballots, conditional provisional ballots, or write-in votes.

  • An audit escalates in the event that preliminary outcomes are found to be incorrect.

  • Unlike other aspects of the election process, state law does not require post-election audits to be recorded by live video for public viewing. Party representatives who observe the hand count may bring their own video cameras to record the proceedings. However, in Maricopa County, audits are open for observation and the results are immediately available for public review through the Arizona secretary of state’s office and website.

  • Audits are conducted prior to certification of official election results.

  • The results of an escalated audit may reverse the preliminary outcome of an audited contest if an error is detected.


Ballot accounting and reconciliation: Unsatisfactory

  • All ballots are accounted for at the precinct level.

  • Precincts are required to compare and reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

  • Counties are not explicitly required to compare and reconcile precinct totals with countywide results to ensure that they add up to the correct amount.

  • There is no statutorily mandated review process to ensure that all voting machine memory cards have been properly loaded onto the tally server at the county level.

  • Counties using automatic vote tabulating equipment are required to make vote tally and reconciliation results public, although the law is vague on the process for doing so. All other counties are required to post vote tallies for each candidate and ballot issue, along with the number of ballots that were cast and rejected, outside each polling place.
     

Paper absentee ballots: Unsatisfactory

  • The state permits UOCAVA voters to submit completed ballots electronically via fax or web portal.

Voting machine certification requirements: Fair

  • Before they may be purchased and used in the state, all voting machines must be certified by the Election Assistance Commission.

  • Some jurisdictions in the state likely still use voting machines that were purchased more than a decade ago.

Pre-election logic and accuracy testing: Fair

  • Counties conduct mandatory logic and accuracy testing on all voting machines prior to an election.

  • Testing is open to the public.

  • For touchscreen and ADA accessible equipment, testing takes place within seven business days before early voting, while optical and digital scan equipment is tested within 10 business days before the election.






 

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