* The information provided below is compiled from various independent organizations working on election defense. US BASE cannot verify the accuracy of all data. Additionally we cannot vet every state or local organization working on election defense.
Delaware Technology in Use
Verified Voting Foundation
* Note that "Paper Ballot" in the map below typically designates paper ballots counted by an electronic scanning device.
Center for American Progress State by State Voting System Report
See State Grade Below
"In August 2017, the Center for American Progress released a report entitled “9 Solutions for Securing America’s Elections,” laying out nine vulnerabilities in election infrastructure and solutions to help improve election security in time for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This report builds on that analysis to provide an overview of election security and preparedness in each state, looking specifically at state requirements and practices related to:
1. Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
2. Voter-verified paper ballots
3. Post-election audits that test election results
4. Ballot accounting and reconciliation
5. Return of voted paper absentee ballots
6. Voting machine certification requirements
7. Pre-election logic and accuracy testing
This report provides an overview of state compliance with baseline standards to protect their elections from hacking and machine malfunction. Some experts may contend that additional standards, beyond those mentioned here, should be required of states to improve election security. The chief purpose of this report is to provide information on how states are faring in meeting even the minimum standards necessary to help secure their elections.
It is important to note at the outset that this report is not meant to be comprehen- sive of all practices that touch on issues of election security. We recognize that local jurisdictions sometimes have different or supplemental requirements and proce- dures from those required by the state. However, this report only considers state requirements reflected in statutes and regulations and does not include the more granular—and voluminous—information on more localized practices. Furthermore, this report does not address specific information technology (IT) requirements for voting machine hardware, software, or the design of pre-election testing ballots and system programming. And while we consider some minimum cybersecurity best practices, we do not analyze specific cyberinfrastructure or system programming requirements. These technical standards and protocols deserve analysis by computer scientists and IT professionals who have the necessary expertise to adequately assess the sufficiency of state requirements in those specialized areas."
Delaware allows voting using machines that do not provide a paper record and fails to mandate post-election audits, which does not provide confirmation that ballots are cast as the voter intends and counted as cast. The state’s ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures also need improvement, and the fact that Delaware allows some absentee voters to return voted ballots electronically leaves its elections vulnerable to manipulation. The state did earn points for adhering to recommended cybersecurity best practices related to voter registration systems, including requiring cybersecurity training for election officials. Delaware also exercises good practices by requiring that all voting machines be tested to EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines prior to being purchased or used in the state, and by requiring election officials to carry out pre-election logic and accuracy testing on all machines that will be used in an upcoming election.
To improve its overall election security, Delaware should stop using paperless DRE machines that leaves the state vulnerable to cyberattacks and prevents it from carrying out meaningful post-election audits to confirm the accuracy of election results. It is encouraging that the state is currently seeking bids to replace all voting machines by 2020 and also is looking at potentially switching over to a system that produces a voter-verified paper audit trail. By switching to a paper-based voting system and carrying out robust post-election audits—ideally risk-limiting audits—that test the accuracy of election outcomes, Delaware can drastically improve the security of its elections. Additionally, Delaware should strengthen its ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures by requiring that all ballots—used, unused, and spoiled—be accounted for at polling places. Part of this involves comparing and reconciling the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at a given polling place, among other things. Finally, the state should prohibit voters stationed or living overseas from returning voted ballots electronically, as the electronic return of voted ballots is a practice warned by election security experts as notoriously insecure.
Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration system: Good
The state’s voter registration system is estimated to be at least 10 years old.
The state’s voter registration system provides access control to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the database.
The state’s voter registration system has logging capabilities to track modifications to the database.
The state’s voter registration system includes an intrusion detection system that monitors incoming and outgoing traffic for irregularities.
• The state performs regular vulnerability assessments on its voter registration system.
The state has enlisted DHS to help assess and identify potential threats to its voter registration system.
The state provides cybersecurity training to election officials.
The state does not use electronic poll books, and therefore was not graded on e-pollbook best practices.
Voter-verified paper audit trail: Unsatisfactory
Elections are carried out using paperless DRE machines.
Post-election audits: Unsatisfactory
Delaware does not carry out mandatory post-election audits that confirm the accuracy of election outcomes. Instead, the state conducts a hand-to-eye review of DRE machine results as part of its official canvassing process. That process occurs two days after Election Day. If discrepancies of 0.5 percent or more is discovered, further investigation is required and absentee ballots may be hand counted to confirm results. After certification, counties can decide to conduct their own review, but there is no requirement that they do so.
Ballot accounting and reconciliation: Unsatisfactory
Some ballot accounting is conducted at the precinct level, but some is conducted at the county level.
Precincts are not required to compare and reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.
Counties are required to review and account for precinct totals with countywide results to ensure that they add up to the correct amount.
Counties are required to review account for all voting machine memory cards or flash drives to ensure they have been properly loaded onto the tally server.
State law requires that election results be made public, and while information regarding ballot reconciliation processes and results is not published on the state’s website, it is available upon request.
Paper absentee ballots: Unsatisfactory
The state permits UOCAVA voters and those with disabilities to return voted ballots electronically, via email and fax.
Voting machine certification requirements: Fair
Before being purchased and used for an election, all voting machines must be shown to meet or exceed federal voting system standards.
Some jurisdictions in the state likely still use voting machines that were purchased more than a decade ago. However, we are told that Delaware is in the process of seeking bids to update and replace all voting systems in time for the 2020 elections. As part of the bidding process, the state will consider voting systems that produce a voter-verified paper audit trail.
Pre-election logic and accuracy testing: Fair
Election officials conduct mandatory logic and accuracy testing on all voting machines prior to an election.
Testing is open to the public.
Testing occurs within five days before an election.