* The information provided below is compiled from various independent organizations working on election defense. US BASE cannot verify the accuracy of all data. Additionally we cannot vet every state or local organization working on election defense. 

Hawai Technology in Use
Verified Voting Foundation

* Note that "Paper Ballot" in the map below typically designates paper ballots counted by an electronic scanning device. 

Click for Verified Voting's interactive map

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Center for American Progress State by State Voting System Report

See State Grade Below

Report Excerpt:

"In August 2017, the Center for American Progress released a report entitled “9 Solutions for Securing America’s Elections,” laying out nine vulnerabilities in election infrastructure and solutions to help improve election security in time for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This report builds on that analysis to provide an overview of election security and preparedness in each state, looking specifically at state requirements and practices related to:

1. Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
2. Voter-verified paper ballots
3. Post-election audits that test election results
4. Ballot accounting and reconciliation
5. Return of voted paper absentee ballots
6. Voting machine certification requirements
7. Pre-election logic and accuracy testing

This report provides an overview of state compliance with baseline standards to protect their elections from hacking and machine malfunction. Some experts may contend that additional standards, beyond those mentioned here, should be required of states to improve election security. The chief purpose of this report is to provide information on how states are faring in meeting even the minimum standards necessary to help secure their elections.

It is important to note at the outset that this report is not meant to be comprehen- sive of all practices that touch on issues of election security. We recognize that local jurisdictions sometimes have different or supplemental requirements and proce- dures from those required by the state. However, this report only considers state requirements reflected in statutes and regulations and does not include the more granular—and voluminous—information on more localized practices. Furthermore, this report does not address specific information technology (IT) requirements for voting machine hardware, software, or the design of pre-election testing ballots and system programming. And while we consider some minimum cybersecurity best practices, we do not analyze specific cyberinfrastructure or system programming requirements. These technical standards and protocols deserve analysis by computer scientists and IT professionals who have the necessary expertise to adequately assess the sufficiency of state requirements in those specialized areas."

Hawaii: D/C*

Although Hawaii conducts its elections using paper ballots and voting machines that provide a paper record, its post-election audits lack important criteria. Currently, the number of ballots included in an audit is based on a fixed percentage—10 percent of precincts using electronic voting systems—rather than a statistically significant number tied to the margin of victory in one or more ballot contests. Also, the results of the audit are only made public upon request. Adding to this is the fact that Hawaii allows absentee voters to return voted ballots electronically, a practice that election security experts say is notoriously insecure Moreover, pre-election logic and accuracy testing is left to the discretion of local election officials. Unfortunately, state officials—citing legal reasons— refused to provide us with information on cybersecurity standards for the state’s voter registration system and we were unable to locate much of the information independently. If Hawaii is adhering to all of the minimum cybersecurity best practices for voter registration systems, it would receive a “good” score—worth 3 points—for that category, bringing its grade up to a C. Hawaii did earn points for requiring that all voting machines be tested against EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines before being purchased or used in the state.

To improve its overall election security, Hawaii would do well to tie the number of ballots included in an audit to a statistically significant number based on the margin of victory between one or more ballot contests, and automatically make audit results public in the interest of transparency. Hawaii should also require that all voting machines undergo logic and accuracy testing prior to an election rather than leaving the number of machines tested to the discretion of election officials. The state can also strengthen its ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures by requiring election officials at individual polling places to account for all ballots—used, unused, and spoiled—on election night. Part of this involves comparing the number of ballots to the number of people who signed into the polling place. Finally, the state should prohibit absentee voters—including UOCAVA voters—from returning voted ballots electronically. Going forward, all voted ballots should be returned by mail or delivered in person.

Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration system: Incomplete

*State officials –citing legal reasons—refused to share information on cybersecurity requirements for the state’s voter registration system. Information gathered for this section derives from independent research. If Hawaii does require the missing cybersecurity best practices, its grade would be raised from a D to a C.

  • The state migrated to a new voter registration system in 2017.

  • The state’s voter registration system provides access control to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the database.

  • State officials were unable to provide us with information on whether the state’s voter registration system has logging capabilities to track modifications to the database.

  • State officials were unable to provide us with information on whether the state’s voter registration system includes an intrusion detection system that monitors incoming and outgoing traffic for irregularities.

  • State officials were unable to provide us with information on whether the state performs regular vulnerability assessments on its voter registration system.

  • State officials were unable to provide us with information on whether the state has enlisted the National Guard or DHS to help assess and identify potential threats to its voter registration system. State officials were unable to provide us with information on whether the state provides cybersecurity training for election officials.

  • The state does not use electronic poll books, and therefore was not graded on e-poll book best practices.

Voter-verified paper audit trail: Fair

  • Depending on the jurisdiction, some voters in Hawaii cast paper ballots, while others vote using DRE machines with VVPR

Post-election audits: Fair

  • The state conducts mandatory post-election audits.

  • The state’s post-election audits are conducted through manual hand count.

  • Audits are conducted on at least 10 percent of precincts.

  • The precincts included in the audit are randomly selected.

  • All categories of ballots—regular, early voting, absentee, provisional, and UOCAVA—are eligible for auditing.

  • An audit escalates in the event that preliminary outcomes are found to be incorrect.

  • Audit results are publicly available upon request. Hawaii migrated to a new voter registration system in 2017. 68 Center for American Progress | Election Security in All 50 States

  • Audits are carried out on Election Day before certification of official election results.

  • An audit can reverse the preliminary outcome of an audited contest if an error is detected.

Ballot accounting and reconciliation: Unsatisfactory

  • Ballots are not fully accounted for at the precinct level. Some ballot accounting procedures occur at the polling place, while others occur at the central counting center.

  • Precincts are not required to compare and reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at the polling place. That process takes place at the central counting center.

  • After an election, central counting centers compare and reconcile precinct totals with countywide results to ensure that they add up to the correct amount.

  • Counting centers review and account for all voting machine memory cards to ensure that they have been properly loaded onto the tally server.

  • The state requires that all election results and reconciliation procedures be made public.

Paper absentee ballots: Unsatisfactory

  • In addition to UOCAVA voters, all permanent absentee voters who do not receive a mailed ballot within five days of the election are permitted to submit completed ballots electronically, via email.

Voting machine certification requirements: Fair

  • Before they may be purchased and used in the state, all voting machines must be certified by the Election Assistance Commission.

  • All voting machines in Hawaii have been replaced within the past 10 years.

Pre-election logic and accuracy testing: Unsatisfactory

  • Election officials conduct logic and accuracy testing on at least some voting machines prior to an election. The number of machines tested is left to the discretion of election observers, who are responsible for carrying out testing.

  • Testing is open to the public.

  • Tabulating machines used for counting absentee ballots must be tested one week before an election, while all other voting machines are tested one month before an election