* The information provided below is compiled from various independent organizations working on election defense. US BASE cannot verify the accuracy of all data. Additionally we cannot vet every state or local organization working on election defense. 


Maine Technology in Use
Verified Voting Foundation

* Note that "Paper Ballot" in the map below typically designates paper ballots counted by an electronic scanning device. 

Click for Verified Voting's interactive map

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Center for American Progress State by State Voting System Report

See State Grade Below

Report Excerpt:

"In August 2017, the Center for American Progress released a report entitled “9 Solutions for Securing America’s Elections,” laying out nine vulnerabilities in election infrastructure and solutions to help improve election security in time for the 2018 and 2020 elections. This report builds on that analysis to provide an overview of election security and preparedness in each state, looking specifically at state requirements and practices related to:

1. Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems
2. Voter-verified paper ballots
3. Post-election audits that test election results
4. Ballot accounting and reconciliation
5. Return of voted paper absentee ballots
6. Voting machine certification requirements
7. Pre-election logic and accuracy testing

This report provides an overview of state compliance with baseline standards to protect their elections from hacking and machine malfunction. Some experts may contend that additional standards, beyond those mentioned here, should be required of states to improve election security. The chief purpose of this report is to provide information on how states are faring in meeting even the minimum standards necessary to help secure their elections.

It is important to note at the outset that this report is not meant to be comprehen- sive of all practices that touch on issues of election security. We recognize that local jurisdictions sometimes have different or supplemental requirements and proce- dures from those required by the state. However, this report only considers state requirements reflected in statutes and regulations and does not include the more granular—and voluminous—information on more localized practices. Furthermore, this report does not address specific information technology (IT) requirements for voting machine hardware, software, or the design of pre-election testing ballots and system programming. And while we consider some minimum cybersecurity best practices, we do not analyze specific cyberinfrastructure or system programming requirements. These technical standards and protocols deserve analysis by computer scientists and IT professionals who have the necessary expertise to adequately assess the sufficiency of state requirements in those specialized areas."

Maine: C

Maine adheres to a number of minimum cybersecurity best practices related to voter registration systems and conducts its elections with paper ballots, but its failure to carry out post-election audits that test the accuracy of election outcomes leaves the state open to undetected hacking and other Election Day problems. Maine also allows voters stationed or living overseas to return voted ballots electronically, a practice that election security experts say is notoriously insecure. Improvements can also be made to Maine’s ballot accounting and reconciliation procedures. The state did earn points for requiring election officials to carry out pre-election logic and accuracy testing on all machines that will be used in an upcoming election.

To improve its overall election security, Maine must put into place meaningful post-election audits that can confirm election outcomes with a high degree of confidence. In doing so, the state should look to risk-limiting audits like those in Colorado as a potential model. Maine should also require election officials to receive cybersecurity training prior to elections and should move forward with its plan to partner with DHS to identify and assess vulnerabilities in its voter registration system. While recognizing the importance of state autonomy when it comes to elections, federal agencies with expertise in cybersecurity and access to classified information on contemporaneous cyberthreats have the personnel and resources necessary to thoroughly probe and analyze complex election databases, machines, and cybervulnerabilities. By combining their expertise on cyberthreats and their insight into the unique qualities of localized election infrastructure, state and federal officials can better assess and deter attempts at electoral disruption. Maine should also prohibit electronic absentee voting, even for UOCAVA voters, and require that all voted ballots be returned by mail or delivered in person. Additionally, even though all voting machines currently in use may have been certified by the Election Assistance Commission, state law should explicitly require that all voting machines be tested to ensure that they meet or exceed federal standards related to functionality, security, and accessibility. Finally, polling places must reconcile the number of ballots cast with Maine receives a C 92 Center for American Progress | Election Security in All 50 States the number of ballots that were spoiled, unused, or—in the case of absentee ballots—issued but not returned by the deadline. As part of the post-election ballot accounting, precincts should also compare and reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at the polling place to ensure that no ballots were lost and no invalid ballots were added.

Minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration system: Fair

  • The state’s voter registration system is estimated to be at least 10 years old.

  • The state’s voter registration system provides access control to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the database.

  • The state’s voter registration system has logging capabilities to track modifications to the database.

  • The state’s voter registration system includes an intrusion detection system that monitors incoming and outgoing traffic for irregularities.

  • The state performs regular vulnerability assessments and penetration testing on its voter registration system.

  • In 2017, state officials met with the Maine National Guard and were introduced to the DHS staff from the New England region and the DHS staff member assigned to Maine. Although the state is not currently working with DHS, it does have the ability to enlist DHS’s help as needed.

  • The state does not currently provide cybersecurity training to election officials.

  • The state does not use electronic poll books, and therefore was not graded on e-poll book best practices.

Voter-verified paper audit trail: Good

  • Elections are carried out using paper ballots and digital scan tabulators.

Post-election audits: Unsatisfactory

  • State law does not require post-election audits.

Ballot accounting and reconciliation: Unsatisfactory

  • Ballots are not fully accounted for at the precinct level. For example, there is no formal reconciliation required of the number of ballots cast versus those spoiled, unused, or—in the case of absentee ballots—issued but not returned by the deadline.

  • Precincts are not required to compare and reconcile the number of ballots with the number of voters who signed in at the polling place.

  • Municipalities with more than one precinct are required to compare and reconcile precinct totals with the municipal-wide results to ensure that they add up to the correct amount. 93 Center for American Progress | Election Security in All 50 States

  • The state does not use a tally server. As such, a memory card review process is unnecessary.

  • The state requires that all election results and reconciliation procedures be made public.

Paper absentee ballots: Unsatisfactory

  • The state permits UOCAVA voters to submit completed ballots electronically, via email or fax

Voting machine certification requirements: Fair

  • Before they may be purchased and used in the state, all voting machines must be certified by the Election Assistance Commission.

  • Some jurisdictions in the state likely still use voting machines that were pur- chased more than a decade ago.

Pre-election logic and accuracy testing: Fair

  • Election officials conduct mandatory logic and accuracy testing on all voting machines prior to an election.

  • Testing is open to the public.

  • Testing must be completed at least one week before the election.